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An Ecologist Struggles with the Problem of Evil: Why 
Aldo Leopold and Baby Meadowlarks Argue against  
an All-powerful God 
 
Larkin A. Powell 
 
“A theology squares with validated materials. It cannot do otherwise.”1 
—R. A. Cheville   
 
I am a wildlife population ecologist; I study factors that cause populations of 
animals to increase or decrease in number. Ecologists2 focus their studies on living and 
nonliving components of ecosystems. In this paper, I describe how my career as a 
scientist and ecologist has influenced my current theology. And I will describe how my 
theology has been shaped by my experiences with baby meadowlarks and the writings of 
Aldo Leopold.  
 
Roy Cheville wrote in a 1971 letter to a “good friend”: “Today people of 
inquiring mind are wondering about the kind of God they can and do believe in, in the 
light of the universe and of the history of things as they see things. These people ask, 
‘What kind of God can I believe in?’”3 This question has perplexed me since I began my 
journey to become an ecologist.     
 
First and foremost, I agree with Cheville’s assertion that a person’s theology must 
not conflict with facts known to that person. The facts that I am most familiar with are the 
natural laws and processes of our biological universe. Thus, my theology must square 
with my most current understanding of those scientific facts.  
  
Second, I come to this discussion with a belief that a theology should guide and 
inspire one’s daily decisions. Robert McAfee Brown proposed that “. . . any future 
theology I do must put the welfare of children above the niceties of metaphysics. Any 
theology that provides for the creative growth of children will make it satisfactorily on all 
other scores.”4 As a college student, I was first introduced to this idea by Robert Mesle;5 
the rubric provided me with a valuable starting point to evaluate my growing theology 
and make it relevant to my world. Even before I had a son of my own, I could see the 
value of a “child rubric” for theology.  
  
We might find a useful example of this rubric in the decision our nation makes in 
preparedness for natural disasters. Hurricane Katrina recently caused the suffering and 
deaths of many people, including children. How do we respond? Should we investigate 
how our governmental agencies’ plans could be improved, with a goal to reduce death 
and suffering in a future disaster? Our response reveals something about our theology—
perhaps we view the disaster as God’s will. Children suffered for a purpose. Why should 
we spend tax money to improve future planning and response? Or, perhaps we are 
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concerned about our children’s welfare, and we would respond in ways that will reduce 
suffering in the future. I believe Brown would argue, with me, that theologies that do not 
provide for the welfare of children have the potential to be problematic on several counts. 
  
Brown makes an assumption—perhaps unconscious or at least unwritten—in 
using this rubric: human children are the epitome of our concern. Is it possible that this 
rubric can lead to theologies that are not relevant to challenges facing our world?  My 
central question is: “Are human children more worthy as a theological yardstick than 
young lions, young salamanders, young baboons, young trout, young eagles, or a section 
of land?” Here, I extend Brown’s rubric, and I will argue that any theology I would 
consider doing must also provide for the welfare of baby meadowlarks. Mesle has written 
about approaches to human suffering that are “most likely to make the world better for 
children and other living creatures.”6 My contribution to this discussion is to reflect on 
the implications of the additional phrase: “and other living creatures.” I consider the 
implications very relevant and critical to examine.    
 
Theology Should Not Lag behind Facts 
Let me start by describing basic facts that exist in my world. Ecologists and 
bankers and architects live in the same world, but each profession must pay closer 
attention to specific portions of our world—or risk losing their jobs. Because of their 
profession, they are more keenly aware of certain facts. An architect, for example, could 
easily describe load-bearing ratios for pillars of different widths or made from different 
materials. A banker is aware of economic facts that would predict upturns or downturns 
in financial markets. Although these facts are available to me, as an ecologist and 
scientist, I profess ignorance in pillar design and financial predictions. But my profession 
has its set of basic principles:   
1. DNA and evolution. DNA is the basic hereditary building block of life.  
Evolutionary change occurs and can explain the current diversity of our world, as 
well as the patterns of diversity found in the fossil record. Humans (Homo 
sapiens), according to fossil evidence, are the result of a long string of 
evolutionary changes; indeed, for much of hominid history, various forms of 
hominids existed concurrently. During our species’s history, we shared the planet 
with another hominid species, the Neanderthals (Homo neanderthalensis). Human 
theologies tend to be very “Homo sapien-centric,” but the facts suggest that any 
relevant theology should be inclusive—at least to other hominid species that have 
been a part of our world. How do our theologies speak, during the appropriate 
time period, to the welfare of Neanderthal children? 
2. Life and death. Death is a part of the natural world, as animals kill to survive. 
Natural death is a necessary, natural evil; without death, life would not exist. How 
do our theologies speak to the welfare of a water buffalo being hunted by a lion?  
It is to this question that I will return. 
3. Resilience of systems. Disturbance and change are integral to ecosystem 
dynamics. When disturbed, the systems respond in quasi-predictable ways to 
return to equilibrium—a demonstration of system resilience. Cellular processes 
(e.g., respiration and photosynthesis), organismal processes (e.g., reproduction), 
and ecosystem processes (e.g., floral succession after a forest fire) follow natural 
laws. Scientists can describe accurately how these processes work. But, most 
importantly, we can also predict that these systems will have an inherent 
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resilience to disturbance. Body tissues will attempt to repair following an injury, 
animals have a drive to reproduce (and this drive will often increase following a 
decrease in population size), and ecosystems will reorganize and achieve 
equilibrium following a forest fire or other disturbance. How do our theologies 
speak to the nature of nature? 
4. Synergy. Ecosystems have many components (producers, herbivores, carnivores, 
detritivores, abiotic nutrients, etc.). Aldo Leopold wrote, in the 1940s, “The 
outstanding scientific discovery of the twentieth century is not television, or radio, 
but rather the complexity of the land organism.”7 Indeed, the interactions and 
dynamics (synergies) between components make ecosystems greater than the sum 
of their parts. These interactions create uncertainty in our predictions for how 
tissues will repair, how quickly animals will be able to reproduce, or what exact 
path an ecosystem will follow as it responds to a disturbance. With respect to the 
latter, a drought, another disturbance, an unexpected loss or abundance of a key 
nutrient, or the arrival of an invasive species can quickly alter the equilibrium that 
a system finds. As A. N. Whitehead stated, “It lies in the nature of things that the 
many enter into complex unity.”8 How do our theologies speak to the welfare of 
invisible synergies in ecosystems? 
 
I assume other professions are somewhat less familiar with these central facts in 
ecology, just as I am less familiar with the central principles used on a daily basis by 
other professionals. The unfamiliarity with basic facts is one source of potential 
theological conflict between scientists and non-scientists. Most people develop their 
theology by interacting with family, close friends, and relations. In this manner, theology 
has a “generation time,” as it is handed down with modifications from one generation to 
the next. A literal, fundamentalist use of scriptures, which provides insights to 
understanding of the natural world during a period of time 2000 YBP (New Testament) 
and earlier (Old Testament) certainly slows, or even prevents, the incorporation of new 
facts into each generation’s theologies. 
 
A quick look at a timeline of discoveries in biology may exemplify why the 
average person on our earth may not have reconciled their theology with modern 
scientific knowledge. It has been only two generations since the structure of DNA was 
described by Watson and Crick. Only 200 years ago (<10 generations), Lewis and Clarke 
were expectantly exploring North America with an eye out for unicorns,9 and during the 
same 200 years, North Americans started the process of understanding fossil evidence for 
what it was—long-extinct species, including other hominid species. It has only been 250 
years since Darwin described the process of natural selection as an evolutionary force. 
And, it has only been 400 years since Galileo was fighting for his reputation with the 
Catholic Church over Copernicus’s newly proven fact that the sun was the center of our 
solar system—not the earth (Table 1). 
 
It is exceedingly easy to find scriptures in the Bible that do not square with these 
scientific facts. In truth, the establishment of these facts should cause all theologians to 
reexamine their theology to be sure that it squares with these facts. At first glance, the 
cross section of beliefs of current Americans seems to provide evidence that 
incorporation of scientific facts into theology is a slow process. 
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Table 1. Timeline of selected important events in science. 
 
Year(s) Event 
500 BC Greek philosophers propose marine fossils once lived in sea (theory 
forgotten for centuries) 
500 BC Pythagoras suggests earth is a sphere (theory forgotten for centuries) 
1514 Earth revolves around sun (Copernicus) 
1546  First adequate fossil description (Agricola) 
1605 First description of dinosaurs (Verstegan) 
1624 Invention of microscope (Galileo) 
1668 Earthquakes, not biblical flood responsible for marine fossils at high 
altitudes (Hooke) 
1787 Unicorn theory debunked (Camper) 
1788 First accurate S. American fossil reconstruction (Bru) 
1799 First accurate N. American fossil reconstruction (Jefferson) 
1803 Lewis and Clarke expedition (Jefferson suggested they might find 
living mastodons and unicorns) 
1859 Origin of Species published (Darwin) 
1870 Marsh and Cope rivalry names 130 dinosaur species 
1897 Discovery of electrons (Thomson) 
1912 Continental Drift theory (Wegener) 
1959 DNA described (Watson and Crick) 
 
But perhaps the seeming disregard for facts among religious conservatives is not 
just because of low rates of knowledge transmission. Perhaps it is because most people 
are not familiar with available theologies that square scientific facts with theology. Ed 
Larson writes, “Public-opinion surveys suggest that up to half of adult Americans believe 
the basic tenets of young-earth creationism, even though it contradicts virtually 
everything we know about modern physics, astronomy, geology, and biology.”10 Larson 
attributes the spread of creationism to the “continuing appeal of religion.”  Larson argues, 
“People aren’t persuaded by creationist arguments and then become religious. Rather, 
they seek meaning and community in religion and then conclude that young-earth 
creationism must follow. If forced to choose between God and evolution, most people 
will choose God.”   
 
My assertion is that there is a current ministerial failure to serve congregations 
with facts and theological options that square with the facts of our world. I submit that 
“fact incorporation” and “theology squaring” are processes that all ministers should strive 
to support, if the theologies of their flock are to be relevant to the modern world. Indeed, 
Cheville wrote:  
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The facts of ever so many fields can assist us in constructing our theology. They 
can serve us in checking our theology. They can save us from building something 
narrow on one or two fields of experience. A discriminating [person] who sees 
something of the vastness, the antiquity, and the geologic processes of the earth 
and of the planets and galaxies and the space around the earth cannot build [their] 
theology on the idea that the earth was put together instantaneously in 4004 BC. 
[A person] uses the findings of many sciences in building up [their] picture of the 
universe and in seeing how it has come to be. As [they see] all this, God becomes 
more wonderful. 11 
 
Finding Sacredness in Nature 
Some view the universe as a dichotomy, composed of natural and supernatural 
phenomena. Early humans used the powers of a god to explain the unknown, or 
supernatural. Under this view, which is still popular, scientific discoveries may appear to 
threaten theologies. That is, as scientific discoveries continue to be made, the set of 
unexplainable phenomena becomes smaller and smaller. Rain is no longer seen as a gift 
from a god, but a result of humid air releasing moisture under precise conditions that can 
be predicted up to a week in advance with high levels of certainty. Seizures in a child are 
no longer seen as a demonic influence, but a result of a brain injury that can be identified 
and corrected through surgery.  
 
If one holds this dichotomous view of the universe, and if one’s theology 
identifies the supernatural as the domain of god(s), then it is easy to see how science is 
threatening to some theologies. Indeed, under such theologies, science and religion are 
like oil and water and may never mix. As science advances, theism loses ground. This is 
an unfortunate view.  
 
I prefer the process worldview,12 in which no line is drawn between the natural 
and the supernatural. The natural and supernatural are nature; we can support those who 
study nature as they seek to find order and answers. New facts provide new questions and 
new unknowns. As Aldo Leopold wrote: “The ordinary citizen today assumes that 
science knows what makes the [natural] community clock tick; the scientist is equally 
sure that he does not. He knows that the biotic mechanism is so complex that its workings 
may never be fully understood.”13  Thus, the line between known and  unknown is  blurry  
at best. The advantage of the non-dichotomous worldview is that sacredness or divinity 
may be found throughout nature, not only in the unexplainable portions of the universe.  
 
I find sacredness in nature—in the synergies that functionally support ecosystems, 
and in the resilience of systems to maintain equilibrium, or arrive at an ordered state (if 
only for a short time). Certainly, I find the twenty-five day growth of a baby meadowlark, 
from newly formed egg to the fledgling’s first attempts at flight, miraculous.14 
 
Aldo Leopold 
Aldo Leopold is partially responsible for initiating a change in our culture’s 
worldview with regard to the relationship between humans and our natural world. He 
taught the first course in wildlife management and was a professor at the University of 
Wisconsin, after serving as a biologist for the U.S. Forest Service for many years. During 
his university years at Madison, life in the Leopold house meant leaving their family’s 
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Madison home for weekends at “The Shack”—allowing Leopold time to reflect on the 
land around him. In 1949, Leopold posthumously published A Sand County Almanac. It 
is a collection of personal reflections by Leopold about the world surrounding The Shack 
in Sand County, Wisconsin. Leopold leads the reader through a year on his land, 
reflecting on nature’s lessons and clues for sustainable living. The conclusion to the 
Almanac was, for its time, a ground-breaking essay entitled “The Land Ethic.”  Leopold’s 
main thesis is that humans exist in community with the animals and plants and the entire 
ecosystem around them. Commenting on the 1914 extinction of the passenger pigeon, 
Leopold wrote: 
It is a century now since Darwin gave us the first glimpse of the origin of the 
species. We know now what was unknown to all the preceding caravan of 
generations: that [we] are only fellow-voyagers with other creatures in the 
odyssey of evolution. This new knowledge should have given us, by this time, a 
sense of kinship with fellow-creatures; a wish to live and let live; a sense of 
wonder over the magnitude and duration of the biotic enterprise.  
     Above all we should, in the century since Darwin, have come to know that 
[we], while captain of the adventuring ship, [are] hardly the sole object of its 
quest, and that [our] prior assumptions to this effect arose from the simple 
necessity of whistling in the dark.  
     These things, I say, should have come to us. I fear they have not come to 
many.15  
 
Leopold called for a new ethic on our use of the land, an ethic that elevates the 
land (and associated plants and animals) to equal status with humans: “The land ethic 
simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and 
animals, or collectively: the land.”16 
 
Clearly, this was a radical change from the admonition in Genesis for humans to 
use the land for their needs—to have dominion over the land.17 Leopold’s writing 
effected change, and his ethic continues to become more relevant with each ecological 
issue that society faces.  
 
And, Leopold was specific in his writing, regarding the effect that fundamental, 
traditional theologies can have on the land.18 Leopold writes: “Conservation is getting 
nowhere because it is incompatible with our Abrahamic concept of land. We abuse land 
because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us. When we see land as a community 
to which we belong, we may begin to use it with love and respect.”19 “Abraham knew 
exactly what the land was for: it was to drip milk and honey into Abraham’s mouth.”20 
 
It appears that Leopold and I agree that some theologies and ethics do not address 
the welfare of our ecosystems. I submit theology must become relevant to current 
ecological issues that impact society. As Leopold suggests:  
No important change in ethics was ever accomplished without an internal change 
in our intellectual emphasis, loyalties, affections, and convictions. The proof that 
conservation has not yet touched these foundations of conduct lies in the fact that 
philosophy and religion have not yet heard of it. In our attempt to make 
conservation easy, we have made it trivial.21 
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How, then, do we incorporate an ethic for the land in our theology? First, we must  
kneel in the grass and contemplate a nest of baby meadowlarks. 
 
Baby Meadowlarks 
My research focus is on birds. For the purposes of this presentation, I will 
describe one species, the western meadowlark (Sternella neglecta). It is a common 
grassland songbird in western Nebraska.22 Meadowlarks return from migration to breed 
in early spring and may raise as many as two broods of young if their luck holds. But, it 
is rare that their luck holds. In fact, for a given nest of baby meadowlarks, there is a 70 
percent chance that a predator or some other calamity will befall the nest, resulting in no 
offspring from that nest. Thus, it is with the same luck as an extremely effective major 
league baseball batter (30 percent) that a clutch of meadowlarks survives to leave the 
nest.  
 
My students have placed video cameras on meadowlark nests, and our research 
records a shocking array of natural enemies of baby meadowlarks. Nestling meadowlarks 
are essentially helpless creatures before they leave the nest. They cannot thermoregulate 
for two to three days and are helpless to defend themselves against predators. Nestlings 
begin their first day in the nest as immobile and naked; their mobility in twelve days 
increases so that they have the ability to hop one to two feet. Although their growth and 
development is amazingly quick, they are no match for predators. Snakes can eat all the 
nestlings from a nest in about thirty minutes. Death by snake involves, assumedly, some 
initial pain during capture, and then suffocation inside the snake as the digestive process 
begins. Small weasels or other carnivores take nestlings from nests and eat them—
relatively quick deaths, compared to death by mouse. Our videos have captured small 
mice at nests, spending twenty-five minutes slowly gnawing on still-live nestlings. 
Although the predator appears timid to humans, this experience is probably the most 
drawn out and agonizing of the deaths our cameras have recorded. Other biologists have 
recorded fire ants swarming into a nest; a similarly gruesome manner of death. Small 
birds can also be eaten by deer, cattle, and avian predators; they can also drown in floods 
or bake during droughts.  
 
Clearly, baby meadowlarks often suffer. If we heed the ethic espoused by Aldo 
Leopold, their suffering is equal in importance to human suffering. If human life 
expectancy is a valid measure, human suffering may be—from a societal perspective—at 
its lowest point in history. Advances in medical technology, food availability, and 
relatively stable economies and governments are to blame for “unnatural” reductions in 
physical suffering. Certainly suffering still exists locally and individually, with many 
localized conflicts, diseases, natural disasters, and personal decisions that lead to 
suffering in others. The twentieth century was labeled by some as the century with the 
most egregious events of human suffering. That said, a remarkably long series of 
fortunate events have led me to encounter relatively low levels of personal suffering in 
my life—thus far. But, meadowlarks do not have police to guard their nests, and they 
have no acute care centers to heal their injured offspring. As I monitor nests and ponder 
their mortality levels, meadowlarks remind me that suffering exists. How do our 
theologies relate to the suffering of meadowlarks?  It is in this context that I have 
struggled with the problem of evil. 
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Nature and Evil 
Philosophers often distinguish natural evil from moral evil. Definitions are 
numerous, but essentially natural evil is defined as a bad event occurring without the 
intervention of an agent; moral evil occurs because of the intentional action of an agent. 
Two points become important. First, because both definitions rely on the designation of a 
“bad event,” evil of any kind relies on a value judgment. And second, we normally 
substitute “person” for “agent.”  Thus, at the heart of the distinction is the assumption 
that humans have a special, creative capacity to make conscious decisions, which can 
potentially result in bad events. 
  
I noted earlier that ecosystems rely on inherently evil natural events. Prey must 
die for predators to live—by some definitions, these are natural evils. But, if we follow 
Leopold’s call to view humans as an equal participant in nature, our view of human evils 
as uniquely immoral becomes murky, at best. Male deer often kill other male deer during 
mating fights: are these deaths less morally evil than a distraught human male who kills 
his rival?  Llamas instinctively protect sheep from coyote predation: is this act of charity 
less good than a fireman saving a child from a burning building?  Your answer to these 
questions depends on your theology and your evaluation of current knowledge of animal 
intelligence. But regardless, these examples show that humans are not unique in our 
behaviors. We are another animal. 
  
I suggest that it is not especially useful to distinguish between natural and moral 
evil—especially if our purpose is to develop a theology that provides for the welfare of 
nature. One of the best methods for defining evil that I have read is a rubric suggested by 
Mesle;23 that “we judge an event to be evil if we believe we have a moral obligation to 
prevent it if we can.”24 But, even this rubric is stretched by our required “and all living 
creatures” phrase. Most of us would rescue a nest of meadowlarks from an approaching 
snake—trying to prevent what we perceive as an impending evil event. But, posting 
guards at all meadowlark nests would not be a good decision for snakes or the ecosystem. 
We must be able to find a theology in which bad things happen routinely to people, deer, 
and meadowlarks. 
 
As a first step toward that theology, let me nominate an alternate rubric—from 
Leopold—for how we assess good and evil. “A thing is right when it tends to preserve 
the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends 
otherwise.”25 The strength of this rubric is that it does not depend on a dichotomous view 
of evil (natural or moral). Human values still play a pivotal role: however, we must 
ethically decide how do define integrity, stability, and beauty.    
 
The Problem of Evil 
The problem of evil explores a conundrum: if God is omnipotent (all-powerful), 
omniscient (all-knowing), omnipresent (exists everywhere), and all-loving, why does evil 
exist?26 Many philosophers and theologians have wrestled with explanations for why bad 
things happen to people. But to my knowledge, bears, meadowlarks, and the land have 
been ignored by many theologians. The problem of evil becomes relevant in a quest for a 
theology that is relevant to “all living creatures.”  I believe that the process God, as 
described by Whitehead, makes sense in light of all facts. Most critically, the process 
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paradigm enables me to understand and respond when bad things happen to people and 
meadowlarks.  
 
Should we discard reason?  I started this essay with the assertion that theologies 
must square with facts. I work in a profession that maintains that knowledge and concepts 
must be based on repeatable observations.  Bayle27 and Calvin28 suggested that it is not 
possible to reason when it comes to theology. By Cheville’s assertion, I reject the 
Calvinistic argument. Using reason, let me address some common responses, adding my 
perspective as an ecologist, to the problem of evil.            
  
Does evil exist so that good can exist?29 Leibniz asserted in the seventeenth 
century that God surely would have created an evil-free world, if that were preferred. So, 
what we see is the perfect state that God wanted—the best of all possible worlds. Evil is 
evidently necessary. This view has supporters today—Stephen Davis writes that “some 
evil will be used causally by God to help produce the great good of the kingdom of 
God.”30 I think Leibniz  and Davis make a critical point: evil is a part of the natural 
world. But, a God that would prefer a world with evil in it does not offer a comforting 
shoulder to human suffering. And a God that would use evil—even to create eventual 
good—is not a good role model for anyone. Using that logic, we can legitimatize human 
slavery or forced medical experimentation. Using this logic, we could argue that ethical 
hunting is not necessary. Or we could argue that any poison or trap (regardless of speed 
of death or deaths to non-target animals) is acceptable to use to cull coyotes, so long as 
reduction of coyote numbers will be a good thing for society. We could argue that there is 
no reason to use ethical standards for research animals; any pain or suffering is legitimate 
as long as the results improve health or management of natural systems.       
 
Is suffering the result of free will?   Free will is a fundamental component of 
many theologies—that evil exists because God gave humans free will. Evil is the result of 
human decisions, not God’s decisions. In a world without evils, no morals or religious 
virtues would develop. And harkening back to Leibniz, supporters of this theology argue 
that a world with evils, allowed by God through free will, is preferred to a world without 
evils—because the process establishes the kingdom of God. Indeed Stephen Davis writes: 
“…in the kingdom of God, when redemption is complete, all previous sufferings will 
pale into insignificance next to the glory that is to be revealed to us.”31 In opposition, I 
submit that an all-powerful God that would stand by during the slave trade or the 
Crusades or the Holocaust or the extinction of passenger pigeons is not relevant to 
individuals who suffered in those events.  
  
I also argue that free will, in the traditional sense, is a deleterious concept to our 
relationship with our world. That is, free will fuels the notion that humans were hand-
designed by God—set apart in a dichotomous manner from other animals with a uniquely 
human ability to reason and be creative. The free will concept perpetuates the reasoning 
that humans are somehow more important than other components of ecosystems—
because humans have markedly more sophisticated abilities to reason and be creative. In 
actuality, the animal kingdom is best viewed as a gradient of species with different 
capacities for neurological function. Humans certainly appear (from our point of view) to 
be at one end of that spectrum, while sponges, corals, and jellyfish are on the other. But 
all animals make decisions and many animals can be creative. All animals can cause and 
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endure suffering; evil is a part of nature. If God values the individual person or 
meadowlark,32 the free will argument fails our rubric.  
  
Does suffering result from sin?33 A secondary explanation for evil, following the 
“free will” argument, is that evil is God’s will as punishment for mistakes made when 
free-will decisions are made. This argument is, of course, impossible to reconcile with a 
loving God. Regardless, leading religious conservatives34 have claimed Hurricane 
Katrina and other natural disasters were the result of human sins. It is comforting to me 
that the Community of Christ has stated its opposition to this theological response to evil. 
God, the Eternal Creator, weeps for the poor, displaced, mistreated, and diseased 
of the world because of their unnecessary suffering. Such conditions are not 
God’s will. Open your ears to hear the pleading of mothers and fathers in all 
nations who desperately seek a future of hope for their children. Do not turn 
away from them. For in their welfare resides your welfare.35 
 
 The illuminating vision of a weeping God leads me to my last theological 
consideration. 
  
God suffers with us. Process theism suggests a different concept of divine power. 
The process God is envisioned as the soul of the world,36 both influencing and influenced 
by world events.  
  
Process theology provides a holistic view of nature. Rather than a duality of 
humanity (with freedoms) and nature (rigidly determined), the world (from atoms to 
single-celled and multi-celled organisms to humans) is viewed as a series of beings with 
increasingly greater freedom.37 With greater freedom comes greater potential for both 
good and evil; thus, with greater freedom comes greater responsibility.    
  
Freedom by humans and all animals to make decisions is a result of millennia of 
evolution,38 each advance a sacred event. Suffering is a part of nature. Snakes kill baby 
birds. People choose to do bad things. But some baby birds also grow to sing. And some 
people do wonderful things to help their world. Birds and people make creative decisions. 
Thus we have power. Divine power, because it is shared power, is not controlling; Divine 
power is persuasive. This is a different perspective, to be sure—with vast implications. 
David Ray Griffin writes  
Although the two ideas of divine power have coexisted side by side, the idea of 
coercive omnipotence has been dominant. Persons in our culture have thereby 
been taught, in countless ways, to equate divine power, and thereby real power, 
with the power to control, the power to coerce, the power to destroy . . . Given 
these images and feelings embedded deep in our psyches, it is very difficult to 
feel that some other kind of power—in particular, the power of suffering, 
persuasive love—is real power, divine power, power worthy of worship. 
     The idea of God suggested by process theism can solve the problem of evil, is 
intellectually satisfying in many other respects, and would have many beneficial 
psychological and social effects . . . And yet it is widely perceived to be 
religiously inadequate, because it does not portray God as having the kind of 
power with which religious awe has been associated from childhood on.39 
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 The power of persuasion, to me, seems to resemble the power of nature’s 
synergies and resilience. This type of Divine presence makes sense in an ecosystem of 
individuals struggling to survive—each called forward by a Divine who can equally love 
and value predator and prey. I conclude that process theology measures up to the rubric, 
providing for the welfare of all living creatures—a theology in which all creatures matter, 
and God acts to persuade all creatures through the eons of evolution.  
 
Conclusion: Ethical Extensions 
 I conclude by coming back to Leopold’s statement of morality—that good things 
tend to “preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.”40 This 
statement of morality should lead us to action. As Mesle has written, we should support 
“views which place the responsibility firmly on our shoulders to make the world better 
for children and other living creatures.”41      
  
We have also considered Brown’s rubric: “Any theology that provides for the 
creative growth of children will make it satisfactorily on all other scores.”42 As my 
arguments suggest, I believe additional clarification is critical here. In the future of our 
earth, there may be scores of critical decisions that should place the welfare of human 
children secondary to the welfare of baby meadowlarks or other creatures. Such 
conflicts—for example, the comparative value of baby salmon and human children—are 
already being debated and are the hardest of political decisions. But if the welfare of 
human children is used as the yardstick for the moral decision in each instance—if we 
optimize our decisions for the benefit of human children—we may end up destroying a 
portion of the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.      
 
Perhaps you view nature’s integrity as important in your theology as well. Indeed, 
even the musical Oklahoma! recognizes that “We know we belong to the land, and the 
land we belong to is grand!”  But I submit that we need to constantly contemplate how 
our theology serves the welfare of nature. Leopold reflects on another familiar song: 
This sounds simple: do we not already sing our love for the obligation of the land 
of the free and the home of the brave?  Yes, but just what and whom do we love?  
Certainly not the soil, which we are sending helter-skelter downriver. Certainly 
not the waters, which we assume have no function except to turn turbines, float 
barges, and carry off sewage. Certainly not the plants, of which we exterminate 
whole communities without batting an eye. Certainly not the animals, of which 
we have already extirpated many of the largest and most beautiful species. A land 
ethic of course cannot prevent the alteration, management, and use of these 
“resources”, but it does affirm their right to continued existence, and, at least in 
spots, their continued existence in a natural state. In short, a land ethic changes 
the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain 
member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members, and also 
respect for the community as such.43 
 
What do my thoughts mean for ministry—the focus of this forum? First, we 
should constantly reevaluate the relevance of our theologies as individuals, 
congregations, and denominations. The land ethic calls for defendable choices that 
preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of our planet. Second, we should embrace 
science. Science-squared theologies, as Cheville encouraged, embolden us to encourage 
education and welcome new challenges as we explore divinity. Third, we should 
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celebrate nature. A symbiotic relationship with the land calls us to leave our church 
sanctuaries behind as we explore sacredness in the world around us. 
 
My purpose, here, has been to describe a call that I believe resonates in nature—a 
divine call to live as a member of the natural community. A call that urges injured, 
struggling humans forward to find goodness and fulfill purpose. A call that similarly 
urges baby meadowlarks forward in their struggle to leave the nest, regardless of the 
odds. 
 
I hope I have captured Leopold’s true feelings—as reflected in his writings. 
Leopold died in 1948, helping a neighbor fight a grass fire. It was the final, ironic chapter 
of his life. He died, perhaps painfully, as he lived—preserving the integrity, stability, and 
beauty of our planet. I find a grand challenge in Leopold’s ethic. Responding to this 
challenge, I argue, necessitates changes in our ethics, our theology, and our lives. These 
are not easy changes. Leopold acknowledged this struggle: “We shall never achieve 
harmony with land, any more than we shall achieve absolute justice or liberty for people. 
In these higher aspirations the important thing is not to achieve, but to strive.”44  
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